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1RISK AND VALUE IN LABOUR AND CAPITAL MARKETS: THE 
UK CORPORATE ECONOMY, 1980-2005
Steve Toms and Aly Salama
ABSTRACT
The paper sets out a theoretical model linking stock market financial risk to labour market 
conditions, including labour intensity and the risk arising from the specification of labour contracts. 
A value added analysis is conducted combining national and firm level accounts data to examine 
the relationship between the share of value and the share of risk, contrasting manufacturing and 
service industries. In conjunction with a firm level analysis, empirical support for the model is 
established showing rational trade-offs between the risk and value appropriations of investors and 
employees and a less rational accumulation of structured debt finance as the UK economy has 
shifted from manufacturing to services in the last 30 years. The shift to services, flexibility and 
deregulation has tended to promote labour intensity, inflexibility of cost structures, and, as a 
consequence greater financial risk.
Keywords: Operating, financial, leverage, risk, labour, flexible 
2INTRODUCTION
Two important trends have characterised the micro economic structures of many developed 
economies since the early 1980s. The first is the development of financialization1 and the associated 
doctrine of shareholder value maximization. The second is flexibility, characterised for example by 
the emergence of the flexible firm (Atkinson & Meager, 1986) as an alternative to mass production 
(Piore & Sable, 1984), flexible labour markets and associated employment practices. Flexibility in 
this sense is regarded as a feature of a larger transition from regulated labour market policies, 
favouring planning and stable employment, towards a neo-liberal approach favouring laisser-faire 
(Hutton, 1995). These trends have been developed in parallel, and some association has been 
suggested in general terms, for example the pressures of globalization that create a discourse of risk 
and uncertainty as a means of imposing work discipline (Amoore, 2004). The relationship between 
the rise of shareholder value ideology and corporate restructuring has also been widely discussed 
(Jensen, 1993, 2002; Williams, 2000; Froud et al., 2000; Lazonick & O’Sullivan, 2000; Toms & 
Wright, 2002, 2005). 
However, there have been few direct examinations of the theoretical and empirical 
relationship between flexibility and financial risk. Specifically, little is known about the relationship 
between the flexibility of the firm’s cost structure, including its wage costs and the corresponding 
degree of stock market risk. If flexibility is understood broadly as ‘the possibility firms have of 
adapting their productive apparatus, in particular employment levels, to variations without delay 
(Boltanski and Chiapello, 2007, p.194), there are two possible empirical stories likely to contribute 
interesting evidence to the wider debates referred to above. On the one hand, the presence of certain 
costs, such as knowledge-based labour, research or capital intensive activities, and scale based 
production, which have been linked to competitive advantage (Grant, 1996; Lazonick, 1991) may 
also lead to the creation of fixed cost structures that promote shareholder risk. Conversely, if Beck 
(2000) is correct, and the growth of temporary and fixed term contracts has shifted risk from the 
employing organization to the individual, then the presence of flexibility might be expected to 
3attenuate stock market risk. In this second case, flexible firms and flexible labour markets are 
imposed for their impact on underlying cost behaviour, manifesting themselves as an attack on 
‘fixed cost shelters’ that have hitherto protected layers of managerial hierarchy  (Armstrong, 2002). 
Accordingly, meeting investor demand for higher returns entails not only resource reallocation but 
also risk redistribution (Jacoby, 2005, p. 77). In other words, it might therefore be supposed that a 
significant expected outcome of globalization and financialization should be not just increased 
shareholder returns but also the reduction of shareholder risk through flexibilization.
Of course, the degree of flexibilization is an empirical question, not least because like wage 
reductions, risk increases are naturally resisted by employees. There is only a certain degree to 
which risk can be imposed through regulation, not least because the shift to a service based 
knowledge economy implies increased monitoring problems for boards and investors vis-à-vis the 
labour process since the application of knowledge is less tangible and in some cases output is less 
directly quantifiable. 
The purpose of this paper is to present a theoretical model using the concept of risk to link 
labour markets, firms and capital markets. That framework is then used to develop empirical 
propositions to analyse empirically the relationship between rigidity/flexibility in firms’ cost 
structure and corresponding levels of stock market risk in the UK. Empirical proxies are estimated 
using firm-level accounting and stock price data. It compares the relationship in two periods: the 
mid 1980s and the mid 2000s and also examines differences by economic sub-sector.  
FIRMS, MARKETS AND RISK: AN INTEGRATED THEORY
The current paper is by no means the first to propose the simultaneous analysis of capital and labour 
market relationships. Froud et al (1997, p. 348) provide a consciously minimalist and convenient 
account of the relationship between firms and the workforce as mediated inter-alia by cash hungry 
capital markets. To develop the conceptualisation of the mediation process for current purposes, it 
should be recalled that insofar as capital markets demand cash, they take the form of dividend 
4payments and capital gains form another component of the total return. Implied risk, in terms of the 
contingent nature of capital gains and threats to stability and growth of dividend income streams are 
sources of risk to capital market investors which rationally they will seek to minimise. If, as is the 
case in relatively saturated product markets, demand is subject to downside risk, the logical 
response from the firms’ perspective in the Froud et al model is to impose flexibility on the 
workforce and associated employment costs, which has the effect of stabilising the rate of profit 
regardless of variations in demand.
However, unlike previous models, this paper finesses the integration of capital and labour 
market dynamics using the concept of risk. Figure 1 illustrates the proposed relationships. Like 
Froud et al’s model, it is consciously minimalist, and excludes, only for the purpose of developing 
analytical power, the complex interactions arising from regimes of accumulation and regulation. 
Instead, these are shown as a moderating influence of exogenous origin.
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6Regimes of accumulation vary through time, for example, Fordism, post-Fordism and neo-Fordism 
and are the subject of wider historical processes. For the specific purposes of the model, the regime 
of regulation and accumulation is characterised by continua: regulation versus deregulation, 
nationalization versus privatization, concentration versus decentralisation of capital, financialization 
versus socialization, globalization versus separate development and so on.  In the UK case, as 
elsewhere, a useful contrast can be made between the regime of regulation and accumulation that 
prevailed until the early 1980s and the regime of subsequent decades.  In figure 1, the regime of 
accumulation and regulation operates in two directions. First, through the labour market and labour 
process, it impacts on the structure of firms and through their relative bargaining power in supplier 
and labour markets impacts in particular upon their cost structure. Levels of employee insurance 
and protection for example influence the nature of the contract of employment, which together with 
the nature of the labour process, in terms of the tangibility of inputs and outputs, influence the 
extent to which remuneration can be linked to productivity. Second, the regime of accumulation and 
regulation impacts on capital market structure and regulation, for example rules about corporate 
governance, ownership structure, and forms of debt and equity finance.  Mapping these two 
approaches, it can be seen that the model is intended to complement and build upon the 
regulationist approach rather than contradict it.
A concept of central importance to the operation of figure 1 is firm cost flexibility. Again, 
this can be considered in terms of a continuum between flexibility and inflexibility. If firm A has 
completely variable cost (i.e. total flexibility), and sales (S) minus total cost (TC) is 100 – 80, the 
rate of profit is profit (P) divided by (S) = 20%. A fall in demand for the firm’s products of 10%, 
also results in a fall in cost of 10%, so that S – TC = 90 – 72 = 18 and the rate of profit is 18/90 = 
20%. Under this assumption, the rate of profit remains constant regardless of the level of output. In 
contrast, if firm B has a similar starting point but all its costs are fixed, the rate of profit falls: 90 –
80 = 10, 10/90 = 11%. In the case of firm A, risk arising from variation in demand is distributed 
capital market investors 0%, firm stakeholders 100%. In the case of firm B, it is vice versa. The 
7model applies this concept to three specific groups of stakeholders, with equity investors treated as 
a residual group. First, suppliers who provide bought in goods and services and who might benefit 
or not in these terms from the degree of contract flexibility. The second group are employees, who 
may benefit or not from the relative flexibility of the negotiated labour contract. Thirdly, debt 
holders, through the provision of loan finance, can impose some degree of cost inflexibility on the 
firm. Structured loan finance in particular imposes fixed costs on firms which has the same effect of 
allocating risk between lenders and residual shareholders. These relationships were first explained 
by Modigliani and Miller (1958), and require no modification for the purposes of figure 1. Other 
forms of credit, such as overdrafts, may impose costs more likely to vary with the activity of the 
firm and might therefore be viewed as more risky from the point of view of the lender.  
Risk arising from the contractual status of the first two groups comprises operating risk from 
the point of view of all stakeholders including residual equity shareholders. Operating risk 
manifests itself in particular in the form of variability of residual income streams. The third group, 
debt finance, leads specifically to financial risk. As with operating risk, the fixed element of 
associated interest costs can impact on the variability of residual income streams. The difference, 
however, is that to some degree, depending on the regime of accumulation and regulation, debt-
holders can impose legally enforceable rights of asset realization above those of other stakeholders
in the event of default. In other words, financial risk also comprises a bankruptcy risk element. 
In combination, financial risk and operating risk impact on the level of stock market risk. An 
established financial model, the Capital Asset Pricing Model (Sharpe, 1964; Lintner, 1965) is a 
suitable vehicle for conceptualising such risk, since its purpose is to price risk according to the co-
variance of the returns of an individual stock with the returns for a whole market index. In efficient 
markets, stock prices only reflect fundamental values (Summers, 1986) which correspond to the 
underlying cash flows of each traded firm, so the stock market covariance measure should reflect 
the degree of correspondence of an individual firm’s cost flexibility to the market average. A firm 
with more than average fixed cost, for example, will have above average variability in profit and, 
8therefore, it should be expected, such variation in profit should lead the firm’s stock price to 
demonstrate greater variability compared to the average as it progresses through the economic 
cycle.  
It is the variability of the firm’s stock return vis-à vis the general level of market return 
variability that determines the price of risky equity capital and hence reinvestment of profit in the 
corporate economy. Figure 1 links the price of risk to the underlying profit variability of the firm, 
which can be applied to CAPM based firm level investment decision making by estimating the beta 
of the project asset (Brearley, et al, 2006, pp.225-6). Normally the link to financial market price 
behaviour is considered sufficient as a determinant of the cost of risky equity capital for the firm as 
a whole (Buckley, et al., pp.225-229).2 Shareholder value maximisation is an exact corollary of 
such calculations where CAPM co-ordinates determine the economic profit of the firm and its 
capitalization into goodwill or market value added. In the shareholder value model, in particular 
variants that consider the Stern Stewart trade-marked Economic Value Added, it is the return over 
and above a risk adjusted hurdle rate that is said to deliver surplus (Copeland, et al., 1994; 
Bromwich & Walker, 1998; Froud et al., 2000, p.779). Accordingly, shareholder risk reduction is a 
key driver of shareholder value, particularly if as Froud et al (2000, p.785) suggest, the realised rate 
of return is structurally constrained by the necessary costs of committed activities. However, risk 
reduction for shareholders equals concomitant risk increases for the employees of flexible firms and 
suppliers of labour markets. Accordingly, and represented in the final link in the model, the process 
of reinvestment in the economy through financial markets is moderated by the regime of 
accumulation and regulation and in turn results in a revised resource endowment and cost structure 
for the firm.
In summary, figure 1 presents a series of linkages between markets and stakeholder groups 
whose pay-offs are in part governed by the social division of risk, which is significantly moderated 
by the regime of accumulation and regulation. The model accommodates Aglietta & Breton’s 
(2001) specificity and homogenisation dichotomy in that banks operate in the sphere of specific risk 
9and, through focussed lending, mitigate the hazard problems of capital arising from the generation 
of asymmetric information within the firm. Financial market participants on the other hand mitigate 
such problems through portfolio diversification and therefore only deal with the pricing 
consequences of the systematic, or homogenised, proportion of risk. The homogenisation aspect of 
the dichotomy is modified however, because the portion of risk, that is the risk premium, 
homogenised in financial market models, is systematically rooted in underlying relations in the firm 
and associated cash flows rather than merely changes in share prices. Further, systematic risk in 
financial markets can be linked to systematic variations in payment structures arising from the 
labour process. 
Before developing empirical tests of the proposed relationships, it is useful to document the 
trends likely to impact on the nature and direction of hypotheses. The next section examines these 
with respect to the financialization of contractual relationships and the rise of differing measures of 
flexibility in the corporate economy. 
FINANCIALIZATION AND FLEXIBILITY: EMPIRICAL TRENDS
Since the early 1980s, the regime of accumulation and regulation has been modified by several 
important, and related, tendencies. The first is the perceived value of flexibility in production in 
smaller firms (Sabel & Zeitlin, 1997) and the model of flexible specialisation in all firms including 
larger ones (Zeitlin, 2000) which has received considerable attention in recent literature. Since the 
1960s, a pronounced shift towards services in terms of value added relative to manufacturing has 
been documented across a number of advanced economies including the UK (Froud et al., 1997).3
High value added is particularly pronounced in financial services, but much less so in retail 
community and personal services (p.358). A distinction is made between neo-Fordism, which 
implies flexible labour markets and post-Fordism which implies flexible firms with high wage and 
high value activities (Leborgne & Lipietz, 1992). Considering the relationship between the firm and 
capital markets, the distinction is an important one, since neo-Fordist flexibility implies reduced 
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operating risk in favour of capital and at the expense of labour. Post-Fordism, on the other hand, 
implies fixed labour cost and high operating risk, favouring labour at the expense of capital. Which 
of the two is the dominant tendency is an important empirical question.
Employment flexibility has become a major management mantra and manifests itself 
frequently in the form of contract flexibility, with, from the employing organization’s perspective, 
the benefit of rapid adjustability of the workforce size as demand for the firm’s products or services 
shifts (Guest, 2004, p.1). Such ‘low road’ flexibility refers to a movement towards increasing cost-
cutting, casualization and work intensification within labour markets (Michie & Sheehan, 2003; 
Bone, 2006). In the UK, ‘low road’ flexibility would appear to have increased dramatically in the 
1980s and early 1990s (Hutton, 1997). According to the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI 
2002; Tremlett & Collins, 1999) after being stable for a number for years up to 1991, at about 5% 
of the labour force, the temporary workforce grew to about 7.8% in 1997. Between 1984 and 1996, 
the numbers of temporary workers in the UK increased by 31 per cent (Legge, 1998). Boyer and 
Drache (1996, p. 17) represent services as offering low-skill, low-pay jobs contributing to the rise of 
the 'working poor'. 
Alternatively, ‘high road’ flexibility is presented as empowering workers who gain new 
skills and greater autonomy, for example through multi-skilling (Michie & Sheehan, 2003). As 
Hirst and Zeitlin (2001, p.506) suggest, empowerment of employees in the work place has eroded 
class consciousness. Handy (1995) commends ‘portfolio people’ whose working lives are mobile 
and portable, rather than fixed and attached to a corporation. Although not asserted by the gurus too 
often, a corollary of effective knowledge workers is their control over the labour process. In this 
view, it is the knowledge endowed worker who asserts their power over the knowledge-hungry 
organization (Knell, 2000). High and low road elements would appear to be contained in Atkinson 
and Meager’s (1986) model of the flexible firm, which comprises both a stable core workforce and 
a periphery of workers on a variety of less secure, shorter term or ad hoc contractual arrangements. 
The contingent workforce might include both low paid unskilled and expensive highly experienced 
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workers (Casey, et al., 1997).4 There are associated and conflicting trends between white collar 
deskilling and blue collar upskilling with European evidence suggesting the latter is dominant 
(Jonsson, 1998). Meanwhile, the shift from manufacturing to services is likely to increase aggregate 
labour intensity (the proportion of total cost accounted for by labour), relative to capital. 
Financial liberalization, meanwhile has strengthened the importance of connections between 
finance and the rest of the economy (Aglietta & Breton 2001, p. 434), making the analysis of the 
risk-based relationships suggested in figure 1 all the more important. Shareholder value analysis has 
been ideologically significant in this respect, although it offers nothing new in the analytical sense 
(Aglietta, 2000, p. 148). According to this view, financial leverage is used aggressively to satisfy 
capital market demands for growth in equity returns (Aglietta, 2000, p. 151). Associated financial 
strategies include management buy outs (MBOs), leveraged buy outs (LBOs) and share buy backs 
which have increased significantly in Britain since 1980 (Toms and Wright 2002). These increase 
equity returns but also increase stock market risk, which might be a particular problem when 
combined with increased operating risk arising from the changes in industry structure and 
employment relationships discussed above. 
Flexibility in the firm’s production capacity, including labour cost, increases its debt 
capacity, since ability to adjust to market conditions reduces default risk (Mackay, 2003). Huffman 
(1983) assumes the commitment to fixed capacity investment depends on the ex ante debt level. 
Therefore, the capacity decision attenuates the increase in equity risk caused by an increase in 
business risk but that attenuating ability decreases as either revenue declines or the level of 
outstanding debt increases. In view of the theoretical uncertainty in these relationships, some 
empirical testing is justified.
Several studies have examined the impact of the operating leverage ratio, which proxies for 
flexibility in the firm’s operating cost structure, on stock market risk, usually in conjunction with 
the financial leverage ratio (Gahlon & Gentry, 1982; Mandelker & Rhee, 1984; Huffman, 1989; Li 
& Henderson, 1991; Lord, 1996). These studies have confirmed the importance of operating 
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leverage relative to financial leverage. These empirical results provide a useful platform for further 
research that relates these measures to long run changes in employment conditions. 
Reflecting collectively on the tendencies discussed above, it is not clear that the supposed 
advantages in terms of risk avoidance will be unequivocally passed from shareholders to 
employees, and indeed that there may be a redistribution of risk between employee groups 
according to economic sector and status. Some empirical evidence on these relationships is useful, 
and in particular to see which sectors experience greater flexibility in aggregate cost flexibility.
Company accounts have generally been neglected as a resource in the debates about the distribution 
and redistribution of value added between sectors and between stakeholder groups (Froud et al., 
1997, pp. 345-6). In the analysis that follows, extensive use is made of firm-level data as a 
complement to analysis of national income data, in order to provide answers to the empirical issues 
raised in this section and as a test of the earlier theoretical model.
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
The empirical approach comprises three complementary analytical approaches. These are first a 
descriptive analysis of national statistics using Office of National Statistics (ONS) Blue Book and 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) data. Second, a descriptive 
analysis of two samples of firm level data drawn from the first half of the 1980s and the first half of 
the 2000s respectively, and aggregated for some purposes into a pooled sample. Third, inferential 
statistical analysis was conducted on the firm level sample. The purpose of the empirical analysis is 
to investigate the consequences of the shift to services in terms of the risk and reward mix for the 
workforce and any obverse shifts in this mix from the point of view of shareholders.
Table one shows stylised value added tables contrasting services and manufacturing in the 
two sub-periods. It is not possible to construct these tables from a single source, but by combining 
data from the OECD statistical survey of the UK, the ONS Blue Book5 and averages from the sub-
samples of firm level data, trading accounts by major sector can be constructed in this form. Such a 
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presentation is particularly useful as it enables real terms growth to be analysed into the components 
of employment costs and profits, as in conventional value added analysis, but also allows 
identification of changes in the composition of bought in goods and services. The calculations are 
conducted from the bottom up using firm-level data and industry indices. Value added is computed 
gross to include taxation, so that the ratio of net division between wages and profits can be 
computed and analysed. To complement the point to point comparisons in table 1, time series 
analyses of value added were also conducted.
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Table 1: Value added comparisons, service and manufacturing sectors, 1984 and 
2005.
Year Change
1984 2005 % 
Panel a) Services
Sales 100.00 198.00 98.00
Bought in materials and services 76.27 122.98 61.24
Value added (VA) 23.73 75.02 216.13
VA split:
Labour 15.90 50.49 217.55
Profit 7.83 24.53 213.26
VA split (%)
Wages 67.00% 67.30% 0.45%
Profit 33.00% 32.70% -0.91%
Employees  ('000s) 8551 10877 27.20
Wages/sales 15.90% 25.50% 60.38
Wages/employee (1) 100.00 249.64 149.64
Profit/sales 7.83% 12.39% 58.21
Value added/sales 23.73% 37.89% 59.66
Cross period estimates 
Degree of operating leverage 2.18
Cost estimates %
Fixed cost 17.04
Variable Cost 82.96
1984 2005 Change
Panel b) Manufacturing % 
Sales 100.00 130.43 30.43
Bought in materials and services 69.83 81.59 16.84
Value added (VA) 30.17 48.85 61.90
VA split:
Wages 21.30 35.609 67.18
Profit 8.87 13.24 49.24
VA split (%)
Wages 70.60% 72.90% 3.26
Profit 29.40% 27.10% -7.82
Employees  ('000s) 5382 3365 -37.48
Wages/sales 21.30% 27.30% 28.17
Wages/employee (1) 100.00 267.38 167.38
Profit/sales 8.87% 10.15% 14.41
Value added/sales 30.17% 37.45% 24.13
Cross period estimates 
Degree of operating leverage 1.62
Cost estimates %
Fixed cost ` 14.35
Variable Cost 85.65
Notes:
15
(1) Index number 1984=100
In addition to reiterating well-known facts, such as the real terms increase in services relative to 
manufacturing, table 1 also reveals some less well documented trends. In the services sector the 
split between wages and profits has remained constant throughout the period at 67:33. According to 
a time series analysis the mean is 66.2% with a standard deviation of only 1.41% and with 
maximum values of 68.0% and minimum values 63.8% of in 2002 and 1998 respectively. In view 
of this trend, the conflicting evidence of high and low road flexibility is not surprising, since these 
tendencies seem to be cancelling each other out in the aggregate. What is more surprising, however, 
is that the rate of profit in the services sector has increased in the period notwithstanding the
constant share of profit in value added. The cause of the increase lies in the higher gross margins 
that have been achieved. As table 1 shows, the rate of increase in sales has been faster in real terms 
than the rate of increase in bought in goods and services, which has increased the aggregate 
operating margin. There are a number of possible reasons for this, including greater market power 
over suppliers, falls in the relative cost of commodity inputs and reductions in legislated and 
effective corporate taxation rates. 
Whatever the reason, there has been a shift to profits in the sector without a concomitant 
shift from labour to profits. As a result, the expansion of the service sector has occurred in 
association with a significant rise in labour intensity, as illustrated by the rise in the labour to sales 
ratio in table 1. Meanwhile, the rate of increase in profit is 2.18 times the rate of increase in sales. 
This measure, referred to as the degree of operating leverage (DOL), facilitates the computation of 
an empirical proxy for the relative fixity of cost. Accordingly, with a DOL of 2.18, the implied 
fixed cost is 17.04% of the total, with the remainder implied to be variable.6 Many costs have semi-
variable characteristics, but some demonstrate greater fixity, even within fairly wide ranges of 
output. Labour cost would be one example where contracts might be paid at fixed rates instead of 
for the output delivered, which is truer of services, where output is more difficult to measure, than 
manufacturing. As can be seen from table 1, the proportion of fixed cost is higher in services than in 
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manufacturing. In view of the increased labour intensity of services and the relatively high fixed 
cost, the corollary is greater potential risk for shareholders. Because of the higher proportion of 
fixed cost, there is likely to be a higher degree of variation in profit for any given change in sales 
demand, so there are disproportionate returns available to investors if the sector continues to grow. 
Services firms’ profits are therefore also more vulnerable to a fall in sales revenue than 
manufacturing firms. At the same time, the rate of post tax profit is higher for service firms 
compared to manufacturing. The secular trend in service sector profits is consistently higher than 
manufacturing. In the period 1989-2007, net profit rates averaged 15.88% and 10.24% respectively 
for services and manufacturing, with all years showing a positive difference between services and 
manufacturing.7 In the language of conventional economic analysis, such a premium may 
irrationally reflect the distortions of superior market power or taxation effects, or as seems to be the 
case suggested by table 1, as a function of fixed cost, may be a rational risk premium. 
Applying similar measures to manufacturing, it is by comparison a lower risk and lower 
return activity. As in services, there has been an increase in real term sales and a relatively smaller 
increase in bought in goods and services. The rate of profit has therefore risen through time, 
although not to the same extent as services. There has also been a rise in labour intensity, as 
measured by the ratio of labour to sales and a small shift from profits to wages. However, this is 
more than offset by the relative decline in bought in goods and services, thereby allowing the rate of 
profit to rise. Meanwhile, although fewer in number, the remuneration of employees increased at a 
higher rate than for service sector workers. The DOL is lower in manufacturing than services, 
implying a greater proportion of variable cost. Whilst such a cost structure implies some insulation 
from risk for investors, for the employee the opposite is the case, since remuneration is more likely 
to vary with output. In other words, the corollary of the rational risk premium for investors is an 
obverse but equally rational risk premium for employees. It is more risky to work in manufacturing, 
but the rewards are higher.
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Although the analysis at aggregate level yields some potentially interesting results, it is 
useful to keep these on hold pending a further examination with a firm-level dataset. To assist 
further comparison, two sample groups were drawn from the populations of firm level accounting 
and stock market data for two six-year sample periods, 1979-1984 inclusive and 1998-2003
inclusive. The periods were chosen to reflect two different regimes of accumulation, the first being 
associated with a shakeout of manufacturing associated with globalization and liberalization of 
capital markets but which before the miners’ strike of 1984-5 still manifested aspects of entrenched 
trade union power. The second is a strong period of expansion and subsequent contraction of the 
service sector associated with the ‘Dot.com’ boom. For each period, firm-level and market index 
stock price data was obtained from Datastream. Accounting data was obtained from the Cambridge 
University Companies Database CD-ROM and from Datastream for the earlier and later periods 
respectively. To be included in the sample a firm had to have six years continuous accounting 
results and be member of one of the industry groupings set out in table 2 according to the 
Datastream INDC2 classification. These sub-sectors were chosen in order to provide contrasts 
between service and non-service activities and between cyclical and non-cyclical activities. Within 
these broad groups, the sectors were chosen to correspond as closely as possible to ONS Blue Book
definitions for available time series data. Selection on these lines facilitated comparison of sample 
results and trends with national benchmark indices. Firms with unconventional accounting ratios
(e.g. financial and insurance) likely to impair cross-sectional comparability or obviously diversified 
activities and straddling analytical groups (e.g. conglomerates) were explicitly excluded. Exclusions 
due to firms having missing accounting data, missing stock market data or for reasons of industry 
group membership, produced sample sizes of 108 for the period 1979-1984 and 164 for the period 
1998-2003. No attempt was made to achieve continuous panel membership for firms through the 
two periods, since the rate of attrition due to takeovers and corporate failures is very high over such 
a long interval. 
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Industry groupings are formed using Datastream codes at INDC2 level.  These were 
developed into a four way split consisting of BASIC, INDUSTRIAL, CYC, NCYC and reformed 
using a dichotomous variable of service and non-service according to table 2. The services group 
corresponds as closely as possible to the components of the services group in the ONS Blue Book
which was relied upon for the analysis of the data in table 1. GENIN corresponds closely to the 
manufacturing group.
Table 2: Industry Groupings
Group N Group* N Example activities
Non 
Services
201 BASIC 57 Basic
Construction
Building materials
Resources
Utilities
GENIN 51 General industrial
CYCL 123 Cyclical consumer goods
Services 71 Cyclical services
General retail
Information 
Technology
NCYC 41 Healthcare
Non cyclical  services
Food retail
Total 272 272
* Datastream classification, INDC2
A comparative statistical analysis, using mean comparisons, is presented in table 3. To 
complement the analysis in table 1, measures were developed for operating leverage, financial 
leverage and labour intensity. Degree of operating leverage (DOL) is as defined in the discussion of 
table 1 above and measured specifically: DOL= %X / %S, where %X and %S are the 
percentage changes in earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) and in sales respectively, both of 
which are obtained from Datastream. DFL = %Y/%X and Y is the earnings after interest and 
before tax and X is EBIT. LABSAL is the labour cost to sales turnover ratio calculated as L/S for the 
years 1984 and 2004 respectively where L is labour cost and S is sales turnover. The industry 
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groupings in table 2 are used to provide contrasts between mean values through time. Because 
financial ratios are typically non-normally distributed (Ezzamel, et al. 1987), a non-parametric 
mean difference test was also conducted.
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Table 3: Mean difference tests, by variable and industry sector
By main variable
Mean Value by Decade
2000s 1980s Difference t value (1) z value (2)
Operating leverage 
(DOL) 7.284 2.438 4.846 3.734*** 5.583***
Financial leverage 
(DFL) 1.583 1.054 0.529 3.916*** 4.721***
Labour intensity 
(LABSAL) 0.220 0.187 0.033 2.416*** 2.023**
Sales £m 
(DEFSAL) 563.763 660.861 -97.098 0.719 0.895
N 164 108
Operating leverage by industry
Non Service 6.881 2.130 4.751 3.647*** 5.286***
Service 8.350 3.410 4.940 1.454* 2.071**
BASIC 5.837 2.695 3.142 1.501* 1.730*
CYC 7.635 3.299 4.336 1.745** 2.296**
NCYC 11.116 1.131 9.985 2.606*** 3.477***
GENIN 3.859 2.123 1.736 1.338* 3.542***
Financial leverage by industry
Non Service 1.619 1.055 0.565 3.288*** 4.152***
Service 1.488 1.053141 0.434 2.461*** 2.203***
BASIC 1.729 1.125 0.604 1.0901 1.352
CYC 1.625 1.027 0.598 3.201*** 3.552***
NCYC 1.258 1.161 0.097 0.546 0.471
GENIN 1.435 0.995 0.440 3.042*** 2.968***
Labour intensity by industry
Non Service 0.207 0.196 0.010 0.757 0.494
Service 0.255 0.159 0.097 2.848*** 3.092***
BASIC 0.201 0.207 -0.006 1.574*** 1.046
CYC 0.244 0.183 0.061 2.506*** 2.234**
NCYC 0.212 0.136 0.076 3.159*** 2.772***
GENIN 0.273 0.213 0.060 2.824*** 2.700***
Notes:
(1) t-test statistic
(2) Mann Whitney Wilcoxon rank sum test for unmatched data
*** p-value <0.01;  ** < 0.05; * < 0.1*
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As table 3 indicates, there were significant increases in all three variables of interest in the 2000s 
compared to the 1980s. Real terms sales turnover, a control variable, showed a minor and 
insignificant difference. The large and statistically significant increase in operating leverage is 
explained mainly by increases in the non-service, cyclical, and non-cyclical sectors. For the full 
sample, there is a large and significant increase in operating leverage through time. The rate of 
increase is much larger for services than for GENIN (manufacturing), confirming the analysis in 
table 1. The increase in financial leverage is explained by increases in both service and non-service 
sectors, with a slightly larger increase being from non-service, with larger increases in cyclical and 
to some extent in the GENIN manufacturing sub-sector. A generic explanation is the increase in the 
use of debt finance, per se. In the 1980s, 28/108 = 25.9% of firms had no borrowing (DFL = 0), but 
by the 2000s this proportion had fallen to 3/164= 1.82%. The increase in labour intensity is 
explained by increases in the service sector in particular, with some significant increase also in 
manufacturing, but with the increase in non-service intensity being statistically insignificant. Non-
cyclical firms were the most important sub-sector contributing to the increase, with other sectors 
also contributing to the overall increase except the basic group which had a significant decrease.
As suggested above, a possible cause of increased operating leverage is increased labour 
intensity. The relationship between labour intensity and operating leverage and other variables was 
explored further using regression analysis. Following figure 1, each has a potential impact on 
residual stock market risk. Results are reported in table 4. For the purposes of statistical testing 
DOL, DFL, LABSAL and DEFSAL were log-transformed as LNDOL, LNDFL, LABSAL and 
LNDEFSAL respectively, to produce closer correspondence to normal distributions. Even with such 
transformations the residuals of the regression models were non-normal and therefore all tests 
reported in table 4 are specified using non-parametric quantile regression. The following generic 
model was used: 
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RISK = a0+ a1LNLABSAL + a2LNDEFSAL + a3YEAR+ a4,1D1 + a5,2D2 + 
… + a6,n-1Dn-1 + e (1)
Where RISK is measured in turn by LNDOL, LNDFL and BETA, allowing a comparison of which 
type of risk is the most impacted by the labour intensity of the underlying activity. BETA = the 
slope co-efficient of the 60 month time series estimation of the ordinary least squares regression of 
individual stock returns against returns for the market index. For each period, the monthly 
observations are drawn from the calendar years 1980-1984 and 1999-2003 respectively.8 Because 
BETA is computed as a measure relative to an index, it is a stationary measure and therefore shows 
the risk relative to the cross sectional sample.
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Table 4: Determinants of operating, financial and stock market risk
Model (1) 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5
Dependent variable LNDOL LNDFL BETA INDOL BETA
LNLABSAL 0.326 0.004 0.089 0.314 0.161
(2.06)** (0.72) (2.41)** (1.84)* (2.74)***
LNDEFSAL -0.019 0.003 0.099 -0.024 0.073
(0.42) (1.31) (6.58)*** (0.32) (2.94)***
CYC -0.108 0.008 0.003 -0.307 0.014
(0.67) (0.98) (0.05) (1.27) (0.17)
NCYC -0.151 0.001 -0.339 0.015 -0.449
(0.74) (0.07) (4.77)*** (0.05) (4.1)***
GENIN -0.167 0.005 0.061 -0.241 0.019
(0.81) (0.47) (0.86) (0.65) (0.15)
YEAR 0.665 0.189 -0.055
(5.06)*** (27.9)*** (1.23)
Constant 0.905 -0.028 -0.051 1.869 0.358
(1.57) (0.93) (0.26) (1.93) (1.08)
Pseudo R2 0.068 0.064 0.125 0.014 0.124
N (2) 272 272 272 164 164
Notes:
(1) Shapiro-Wilk test rejected the hypothesis of normally distributed residuals; model re-specified 
using non-parametric quantile regression.
(2) Models 1.1-1.3 full sample; models 1.4-1.5 restricted to 1998-2004 sub-sample only 
*** p-value <0.01;  ** < 0.05; * < 0.1*
The results of the regressions for model (1) show that labour intensity is a significant determinant of 
operating leverage, regardless of the period of observation (Models 1.1 and 1.4). Taken together, 
the results in table 3 and models 1.1 and 1.4 therefore suggest that service industry firms 
specifically have become more labour intensive, and have done so whilst taking on operating and 
financial risk in similar proportions to the rest of the economy. Basic industries became more 
capital intensive and basic firms were subject to relatively smaller increases in operating and 
financial risk. As these sub-group illustrations suggest, because more labour intensive firms are 
associated with higher risk in their operating cost structure, labour cost risk would seem to be an 
important component of operating cost risk. Especially in services, it would seem firms are 
becoming more labour intensive, exhibiting greater fixity in their cost structure and becoming 
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thereby less ‘flexible’, increasing the potential risk faced by investors. Such an effect is 
compounded by these firms taking on extra financial leverage in the line with the general increase 
in financial leverage recorded for firms across the whole sample.
Further tests revealed that the positive relationship between labour intensity and operating 
risk persisted for the 1998-2004 sub-sample but not for the earlier period. There was also a positive 
relationship between labour intensity and stock market risk in the 1998-2003 sub-sample but not for 
the earlier period. There was no relationship between labour intensity and financial risk in any of 
the sub-periods or for the combined sample.
The increase in financial leverage noted in table 3 does not appear to be specifically 
associated with a rise in labour intensity or any particular sector (model 1.2), reinforcing the 
conclusion that the increase in leverage has been across the board. Stock market risk, measured by 
BETA, is pushed up significantly by labour intensity (models 1.3 and 1.5), but is also reduced by 
non-cyclical, larger firms, which is to be expected. 
Firms are more labour intensive and more risky from the perspective of the stock market 
investor notwithstanding the reduced employee protection implied by the low road flexibility. 
Conversely, the evidence suggests either an increase in market based implicit bargaining power for 
skilled workers, in line with high road flexibility hypothesis, or a simultaneous increase in risk for 
both employers and employees. Concurrently and whatever the cause of the increase in operating 
risk, there has been a step increase in financial leverage and therefore financial risk, which has 
occurred at the behest of market institutions and corporate managements, without apparent 
reference to the underlying operating risk. Stock market investors face the consequences of 
increases in both these classes of risk. In conclusion, the aggregate risk faced by UK investors has 
increased substantially in the 2000s compared to the 1980s notwithstanding the major institutional 
changes that have occurred in the intervening period.
To examine the possibility of indirect and direct relationships between labour intensity, 
operating leverage, and stock market risk, further tests were carried out. As suggested in figure 1, 
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whereas operating risk and financial risk are important in themselves as reflections of the 
underlying cost structure of the firm and the behaviour of those costs, they are also important for 
their potential transmission of risk into the financial markets. The next series of tests examine these 
relationships. The following generic model was tested: 
BETA = a0 + a1LNDOL + a2LNDFL + a3LNLABSAL + a4LNDEFSAL  + 
a5YEAR+ a6,1D1 + a6,2D2 + … + a6,n-1Dn-1 + e
                   (2)
In view of the relationship between LNDOL and LNLABSAL in table 4, these variables are tested 
independently as determinants of beta. As in the case of model (1) even with variable log 
transformations, the residuals of the regression models were non-normal and, therefore, all tests 
reported in table 5 are specified using non-parametric quantile regression.
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Table 5: Determinants of stock market risk
Model (2) 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6
Dependent  variable BETA BETA BETA BETA BETA BETA
LNDOL 0.033 0.039 -0.008
(1.50)* (1.52)* (0.26)
LNDFL 0.007 0.026 -0.035 0.132 -0.082 0.135
(0.12) (0.62) (0.56) (2.74)*** (1.62) (2.90)***
LNLABSAL 0.087 0.151 0.031
(2.38)*** (2.88)*** (0.59)
LNDEFSAL 0.085 0.098 0.096 0.066 0.066 0.076
(4.24)*** (6.56)*** (3.45)*** (3.16)*** (2.97)*** (3.51)***
CYC 0.020 -0.002 0.059 -0.066 0.028 -0.071
(0.28) (0.04) (0.66) (0.68) (0.38) (0.75)
NCYC -0.323 -0.334 -0.326 -0.320 -0.435 -0.321
(3.47)*** (4.73)*** (2.66)*** (2.89)*** (4.44)*** (2.99)***
GENIN   0.094 0.056 0.188 0.116 0.024 0.104
(1.04) (0.81) (1.39) (1.21) (0.21) (1.08)
YEAR -0.086 -0.052
(1.37) (1.15)
cons  -0.046 -0.036 -0.290 0.202 0.429 0.149
(0.18) (0.18) (0.81) (0.76) (1.45) (0.57)
Rsq 0.122 0.126 0.102 0.205 0.130 0.209
N (2) 272 272 164 108 164 108
Notes:
(1) Shapiro-Wilk tested rejected the hypothesis of normally distributed residuals; model respecified 
using quantile regression.
(2) Models 1.1-1.2 full sample; models 1.3 & 1.5 restricted to 1998-2004 sub-sample only models 
1.4 and 1.6 restricted to 1979-1984 sub-sample only. 
*** p-value <0.01;  ** < 0.05; * < 0.1*
In general, there is a weakly significant positive relationship between operating leverage and stock 
market risk (models 2.1 and 2.3). The relationship is not present al all for tests restricted to the 
1979-1984 sub-sample. Labour intensity is strongly and consistently positively significant for all 
time periods. An interaction variable (LNDOL*LNLABSAL) was used in conjunction with 
LNDOL and LNLABSAL in turn, but was consistently insignificant regardless of time period. In 
other words, in view of their separate significance, labour intensity and operating leverage are 
substitutive rather than complementary determinants of stock market risk.
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Financial leverage is not a consistently strong determinant of stock market risk (models 2.1 
and 2.2). Only in the early sub-period (models 2.4 and 2.6) is there a significant and positive 
relationship. In the later period, the relationship is not significant (models 2.3 and 2.5). Despite the 
increase in financial leverage between the two sub-periods, the evidence suggests that these 
expanded levels of debt were no longer recognised or priced effectively by the stock market of the 
early 2000s. An interaction variable (LNDFL*LNDOL) was used in conjunction with LNDOL and 
LNDFL in turn, but was consistently insignificant regardless of time period. When LNDFL was 
dropped from model 2.1 the significance of LNDOL increased (p < 0.05) and the already highly 
significant co-efficient for LNDFL in model 2.4 improved further in the absence of LNDOL. 
Therefore, financial leverage and operating leverage are substitutive rather than complementary 
determinants of stock market risk. Part of the explanation however, depends on the type of finance 
giving rise to the interest costs in the financial leverage measure. For example, firms using overdraft 
financing only, had significantly higher operating leverage. In other words, firms with commitments 
to fixed operating costs tend to rely on overdrafts rather than structured finance and vice versa for 
firms with low operating leverage.
There are few sector effects except for the tendency of non-cyclical firms to have lower 
stock market risk already noted in the discussion above. The use of sector grouping variables 
improved the overall performance of all models in terms of R-squared when compared with 
alternative models replacing them with a service dummy variable, so these are the models reported 
in tables 4 and 5. However, it should be noted that the significance of the labour intensity and 
operating leverage variables increased, reflecting the higher levels of labour intensity and operating 
leverage in the service industries. 
Drawing generalisations, the consequences of increasing underlying risk are to increase the 
cross-sectional positioning of the firm’s perceived stock market risk. Labour intensity, operating 
leverage and financial leverage in descending order of influence have an effect all the time in the 
first two cases and some of the time in the case of financial leverage. The presence of one without 
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the others is generally sufficient to raise the level of stock market risk to some extent. The effects 
are not sector specific.
These findings, in particular the relative unimportance of financial leverage in the 1998-
2003 period, are surprising in view of the apparent risk of the shareholder value driven financial 
restructurings and wide availability of cheap debt finance. A possible reason, which is also a 
positive explanation of the other results, is that cash flows associated with debt finance are 
immaterial relative to those associated with the other costs of the firm including labour cost. Labour 
cost, particularly that higher portion that is fixed has a more important impact on stock market risk 
and potentially on investment, by raising the cost of capital for firms with those cost patterns. The 
substitutive effects of labour intensity and operating leverage may be explained by the substitution 
of increased fixed cost/reduced variable cost in labour with concurrent increased variable 
cost/reduced fixed cost in the non-labour components of operating leverage. For example, greater 
flexibility in supplier contracts and sub-contracting may give firms the opportunity to make fixed 
investments in the core workforce. 
CONCLUSION: REGIMES OF ACCUMULATION, REGULATION AND RISK
Some of the contrasts between the early 1980s and the early 2000s are as expected. The shift to 
services has been accompanied by greater labour intensity and the level of corporate borrowing has 
increased considerably for all sectors.
Whatever the effects of these shifts on the content and remuneration of labour, it would 
seem that in terms of social risk sharing, the balance has swung in favour of labour and against 
capital. The high road story of post-Fordism and the knowledge economy carries more weight than 
the low road low skilled flexible workforce of neo-Fordism. This conclusion is all the more 
surprising in view of the exclusion of financial services from our analysis in favour of service 
sectors such as transport, support, and retailing that typically might be more suggestive of the low 
road model.  Of course, this does not mean that workers in 2005 are more secure than workers in 
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1985 per se. Changes in the structure of the economy that have been only partially discussed in this 
paper may imply increased risk for all groups in society. What can be said is that whatever the new 
level of risk arising from demand fluctuations, labour bears a smaller part. The implication is that 
financial risk as borne by investors has increased regardless of how it is measured. When the 
increased implied by changes in operating cost structures is added to the much higher levels of 
financial leverage present in the typical firm’s balance sheet in 2003, it is clear that investors were 
sitting on a powder keg of risk.
Acknowledgement: The authors are grateful to seminar participants at the Universities of 
Durham and York for helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper.
NOTES
1. Defined as “… the increasing role of financial motives, financial markets, financial actors and 
financial institutions in the operations of the domestic and international economies.” Epstein (2005, 
p. 3).
2. The evident lack of an empirical relationship between stock market returns and the relationship 
implied by the CAPM has led some to doubt its validity (Davis et al, 2000, Fama and French, 1992, 
1996). However these debates have concerned themselves exclusively with capital market data and 
have made scant reference to the underlying cost structure of the firms involved.
3. After 1973 in all the advanced countries the expansion of service output accounts for roughly 
two-thirds to four-fifths of the increase of GDP: Germany, the UK and the USA are all in the range 
75 to 80 per cent and Japan is not far behind at 62 per cent (Froud et al, 1997: 356).
4. These developments characterise the UK and also reflect similar trends in other industrialized 
economies (e.g. Auer and Cazes, 2003; Felstead and Jewson, 1999).
5. OECD, http://stats.oecd.org/wbos/, productivity and labour indices. ONS, Blue Book, 
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/StatBase/, Indices of Production, Services and Distribution, value 
added by industry, accounts by sector.
6. The formula is: Variable Cost % = Sales – (DOL x net profit), ie 100 – (7.83 x 2.18).
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7. ONS Blue Book, Time Series data, 1989 is the earliest date available for the Services sector.
8. Five inclusive calendar years are used for beta computations, whereas six years of accounting 
data is required in order to compute DOL and other ratios on the basis of five equivalent 
compounding periods.
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